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THE NEW ORDER AND THE ECONOMY
J. Panglaykim and K. D. Thomas
It is rather ironic to recall President Sukarno’s "banting 
stir" speech of April 11, 1965. Just one year and a day after 
that speech, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, Presidium member for 
economic and financial affairs outlined the economic policy of 
the "perfected" Dwikora cabinet, which was formed as a result 
of the first major cabinet reshuffle after the abortive coup.
In it, the Sultan envisaged a substantial "turn of the wheel", 
but it was a "banting stir" in a direction not intended by 
the President the previous year when he had concentrated his 
attacks on foreign capital and private entrepreneurs. In the 
months that followed the Sultan’s speech, there was a vigorous 
debate among the nation’s intellectuals on the content of In­
donesian socialism in the new era and the way in which the 
"just and prosperous society" so dear to the President1 was 
to be attained.
Prominent in the debates were several groups of intellec­
tuals scattered throughout the capital city: some affiliated
to political parties, others in such organizations as the In­
tellectuals’ Action Group (KASI). Membership in the various 
groups is not mutually exclusive. It is possible for a per­
son to belong to a political party and also to be an active 
participant in several formal and informal groups interested 
in discussing economic problems and taking steps to influence 
the government. So a program issued under the name of a par­
ticular organization cannot be regarded as the brain-child of 
that group alone. Most of these groups included among their 
members academic economists, and for the first time in many 
years these groups were able to make their voices heard with 
effect in official circles.
Socialism remains the proclaimed goal of the Republic, but 
the methods of achieving this rather vague end are undergoing 
some important changes as the new government tackles the eco­
nomic problems facing the country. To some extent, we are 
witnessing the return of the pragmatic outlook which was char­
acteristic of the PSI-Masjumi coalition of the early fifties 
when Sumitro and Sjafruddin dominated the scene.2 Although
1. Many of the phrases of the old order have been retained, 
including this one. It may be given a new content, but 
it still remains to be seen whether the new formulation 
will be put into practice.
2. For the use of this terminology see for example Bruce
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these men are no longer members of the elite, there are others 
who have revived this approach to economic issues. In fact, 
some of them were close to the PSI and shared in the decision­
making process of that earlier period.
However, the objective reality facing the present govern­
ment and its advisers is vastly different from what it was 
when the earlier pragmatists were in control. The most impor­
tant difference is the greater share of state ownership of 
the economy than was the case in the early fifties. The taking 
over and subsequent nationalization of Dutch companies in 1957 
and 1958 placed most of the modern industrial-agricultural- 
commercial sector of the economy in the hands of the government. 
The state now has the commanding heights of the economy under 
its control. But the new government, having committed itself 
to some changes in the role of the state in economic affairs 
must still decide how to manage it.
In this article we intend to examine some of the ideas 
already expressed by the government and these groups on the 
type of economy appropriate for Indonesia, and also the debates 
on short run policies. While the debate on ultimate objectives 
continues, the government must act in the economic sphere out 
of necessity. In some ways, the short-run policies may con­
flict with the long-run objectives and we believe that it is 
worthwhile discussing the steps already taken and attempting 
to relate them to the objectives outlined by the government.
The Political Background
The debate on both the nature of the economic system and 
the implementation of regulations designed to further the goals 
of the present government proceeds in an uneasy political at­
mosphere of turmoil and intrigue. As the civilians press their 
claims for recognition and for important positions in the major 
decision-making centers, there is an air of unreality about the 
current political constellation. The eclipse of the old order 
may give rise to a stable coalition between the civilians and 
the army or it may eventually turn towards a government much 
more strongly dominated by the military in spite of the protes­
tations and hopes of General Suharto.
The first outward success of the alliance between the 
civilians and the army in the creation of the new order came 
with the installation of the "perfected" Dwikora cabinet on 
March 30, 1966. Headed by the triumvirate of General Suharto 
(chairman), the Sultan of Jogjakarta and Adam Malik, it was 
short-lived and on July 28 was succeeded by the Ampera cabinet, *
Glassburner, "Economic Policy Making in Indonesia", Economic 
Development and Cultural Change, Vol. X, January 1962, pp. 
113-133.
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presided over by the same triumvirate.
The composition of the Ampera cabinet represented a com­
promise between the varied competing forces which included:
1) the Armed Forces, 2) the political parties, 3) the younger 
generation, 4) the intellectuals (e.g., KASI, Universities),
5) Sukarno and his followers. The steps taken in the economic 
sphere in the second half of 1966 indicate that the Sukarno 
group had declined and that the intellectuals had gained 
ground in close co-operation with certain patrons in the Army.
The position of the intellectuals is not reflected in the 
cabinet itself, but rather at the levels of Director General 
and Secretary General. In the economic field, the ministries 
of Agriculture, Trade, Communications and Maritime Affairs 
are in the hands of members of the Armed Forces, while Finance 
and Estates are administered by Catholics, one of whom is 
chairman of the Catholic Party.3
The two main tasks of the cabinet are to prepare for 
general elections in 1968, and to solve the economic and 
financial problems of the nation.4 Taken together, they con­
stitute a program for both political and economic stability, 
but they can also be regarded as irreconcilable objectives.
The likelihood that the process of the struggle for supremacy 
in the elections would induce a return to the practices of the 
period 1953-1955, is well realized by many Indonesians includ­
ing General Suharto himself.5 The intellectuals have pointed 
to the necessity of preventing a misuse of the country’s re­
sources in the scramble to build up party finances to contest 
the elections. They realize that the parties will attempt to 
weaken the role of the functional groups6 and for this reason
3. A.list of cabinet members, Director Generals and Secretary 
Generals together with some background notes is found in 
Indonesia II.
4. For a statement on the cabinet’s full program see General 
Suharto’s speech to Parliament on August 16, 1966, discus­
sed in Business News, August 24. Decision XI of the MPRS 
(Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly), committed the 
Ampera cabinet to the holding of elections before July 5, 
1968.
5. Ibid.
6. The functional groups include workers, peasants, national 
businessmen, intellectuals and educators, the Armed Forces, 
and so on. In the Parliament selected by the President in 
July 1960, the functional groups had 131 seats out of a total 
of 283 , see H. Feith, ’’Dynamics of Guided Democracy”, in
R. McVey, (ed.), Indonesia, HRAF Press, New Haven, 1963,
Table I, p. 345.
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the Election Law is seen as the focal point in the coming 
struggle,7
For many years, intellectuals in general and economists 
in particular have been excluded from the centers of power and 
their influence has been restricted to the role of private 
citizens who give advice when called upon. In many cases, they 
were consulted unofficially at their homes which is not un­
usual when we recall that the Indonesian elite is small and 
there are always opportunities for informal contact in the 
capital. A significant example of the weakness of the econo­
mists as a "class" was the absence of economists on the Nation­
al Planning Council, the body responsible for the formulation 
of the Eight Year Plan. The intellectuals are organized in 
organizations which at present are very influential, including 
ISEI (Association of Economists) and KASI (Intellectualsf 
Action Group). It is in the interests of the various discus­
sion groups in Djakarta to ensure that the role of the func­
tional groups in such government institutions as the Legisla­
tive Council and the MPRS is strengthened vis-a-vis the par­
ties. And in the present power struggle, they tend to cluster 
around power centers.
Last August a symposium to discuss the general elections 
was organized by the National Research Council, KASI and the 
University of Indonesia. It was proposed that the PSI, Mas- 
jumi and Murba be rehabilitated, and that elections be organ­
ized in single-member constituencies at the kabupaten level. 
Economic stability as a prerequisite for the success of the 
elections was convincingly argued, while the dangers of a rise 
of militarism were recognized. It was felt that the latter 
could only be avoided if the various groups in society were 
represented properly. The symposium concluded that without 
democratic government some of the political parties would move 
towards radicalism as well as irresponsible actions. Such a 
trend could well lead to the replacement of moderate elements 
by extremists of which the final corrollory could be militarism.
The intellectuals, especially those who are uncommitted 
to any party are in a weak and tenuous position. Their only 
hope of a voice in the future of Indonesia would appear to be 
in their ability to seek the patronage of the Army instead of 
the old political groups. The same applies to the smaller 
parties such as Parkindo and the Catholic party. Some of the 
larger parties, especially the PNI, would prefer to incorporate
7. These views were presented in a study-paper prepared by a 
group of intellectuals in Djakarta. Throughout this paper 
the term intellectual is used rather loosely. Only when 
material has been published will we mention groups by name. 
Our main aim is to indicate that contributions to the current 
ferment are not the monopoly of one or two groups.
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the newly emerging groups such as KASI, KAMI into their own 
camps but many feel that the old order minus the Communist 
Party (PKI) does not guarantee adequate representation of the 
modernizing elements aiming at economic development.
There is, however, an air of unreality in the approach 
of the intellectuals and smaller parties, best illustrated by 
the faith they seem to express in the elections: a faith
somewhat reminiscent of the pre-election period of 1953-1955. 
Although they realize that preparations for elections may en­
danger attempts to ensure political stability, they appear to 
regard the elections as a necessary step in the direction of 
such stability.8 It would appear that they hope for an Elec­
tion Law which will minimize the role of the large parties, 
strengthen the position of the functional groups, and dis­
suade the army from extending its own influence. Even if 
the elections are postponed, the role of the army will still 
have to be determined. The intellectuals are aware of the 
dangers and some of them are moving individually into posi­
tions of influence, not only as Director Generals and Secre­
tary Generals but more recently, on the personal staff of 
General Suharto.9
The basic assumption is that the government requires the 
services of the intellectuals; the question is how will they 
find positions of importance? In the early fifties, a promi­
nent group of intellectuals were committed to the PSI-Masjumi 
coalition. Today, not all of the intellectuals are members 
of political parties or are committed to an ideology even 
though the non-party members may belong to such organizations 
as KASI and ISEI. It may well be that even the economists will 
be unable or unwilling to act together through the ISEI which, 
after all, is not fitted for this purpose. Some may prefer to 
act as individuals depending on patrons in the army. If we 
turn to a consideration of the economic scene, we will observe 
that through 1966 intellectuals made their influence felt both 
through their parties and groups and as individuals. Though 
it is too soon to be sure whether this tendency will continue, 
the intellectuals have so far played a decisive role in shap­
ing economic policy.
8. In July there were already rumors that both the PNI and the 
NU were making attempts to attract ex-PKI into their ranks 
with their eyes on the promised elections.
9. Five economists became members of Suharto's personal staff 
as advisers to the general in his role as chairman of the 
Economic Stabilization Council. Their appointments were 
made on 12 September but were not reported in Business 
News until November 30, 1966.
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The Future Economic System: Basic
Principles and Objectives
The search for an economic system suited to Indonesian 
conditions has been a tortuous one. Socialism has been the 
accented goal of all parties, but the content of their pro­
grams differed widely and their action more so.10
Ideas on the nature of the economic system suited to In­
donesia were considered in the short life of the "perfected” 
Dwikora cabinet, although it was faced with a serious economic 
crisis when it took office. "Static expansion" characterized 
the development of the economy during the fifties but there 
were signs by the mid-sixties that unless there was an increase 
in investment in several sectors population growth would soon 
outstrip the economy’s capacity to provide for its people with­
out an increase in the death rate. The most pressing imme­
diate problems were inflation and a heavy burden of repayment 
of foreign debts, part of which had not been used to expand 
productive capacity and were therefore not self-financing.
The new government advanced on several fronts always with the 
short-term objective of debt rescheduling in mind.
The first major statement on domestic economic policy was 
made by the Sultan, the Vice-First Minister for Economics and 
Finance, in a report to ministers and the press on April 12, 
1966. In this address, the Sultan mentioned most of the issues 
which were subsequently elaborated in policy speeches by other 
cabinet ministers, while some of them were contained in MPRS 
Decision XXIII. The points covered included:
1. The burdens of foreign debt and inflation were candidly 
assessed. He admitted the country was unable to repay 
its debts and at the same time finance essential im­
ports from current foreign exchange earnings. He an­
nounced that the government would approach its credi­
tors to discuss rescheduling.
2. Emphasis was placed on the necessity to rehabilitate 
the infra-structure especially through the import of 
spare parts for all types of vehicles.
3. Government policy was to be judged by economic consid­
erations, not ideological and political ones.
10. For a discussion of ideas on socialism see for example K.
D. Thomas, Indonesia’s Approach to Socialism, 1950-1960 
- An Historical Analysis m  Political Economy, unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of California (Berkeley), 1962, and 
on trends during the period 1963-1965 see L. Castles, 
"Socialism and Private Business: The Latest Phase", Bulle­
tin of Indonesian Economic Studies, Australian National 
University, Canberra, No. 11, June 1965.
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4. The regions were to be allowed to play a more active 
and positive role in economic development. They will 
be permitted to use their own resources for their own 
needs without detracting from or hindering the economic 
policies of the central government.
5. State Enterprises are to be operated in accordance 
with economic norms. The functions of the General 
Management Councils will be reviewed.11 12
6. .The taxation system would be reviewed.
7. Socialism was declared to be the main objective of 
the Revolution as it has been in the past. But it 
was pointed out that this was a long-term goal. The 
Sultan said that he was discussing short-term measures 
for rehabilitation and stabilization, so that it was 
necessary to take action on the basis of an assessment 
of current realities. Swasta (private enterprise) is 
at present a strong and important sector. "A pragmatic 
approach therefore justifies a policy of giving pri­
vate enterprise an opportunity to develop and regulate 
itself in the attempt to rehabilitate and stabilize 
our economy according to the directions indicated by 
the government".1 *
Few of the issues raised by the Sultan were analysed in 
detail and during the months that followed they were the sub­
ject of intense debate in both government and intellectual 
circles. Even so, the policy decisions which resulted from 
these discussions were not the fruits of a mere two months.
They were the outcome of many years of discussions among var­
ious groups in the capital during the period when free discus­
sion was not encouraged. Groups from various parties, especial­
ly the smaller parties such as the PSI, and the Catholic party 
along with the well-known group from the Faculty of Economics, 
University of Indonesia, were preparing programs for economic 
development in the hopes that some day they would be heard and 
implemented.
The MPRS Decision XXIII of July 5, 1966, on the Reform 
of the Basic Economic, Financial and Developmental Policy was 
presented as a reversal of the Presidential policies of the
11. On the General Management Councils see Dr. J. Panglaykim, 
"Worker-Management Councils", World Politics, January,
1965.
12. For a full text of the Sultan's statement see Republic of 
Indonesia Radio Broadcast, Siaran Pemerintah, 12 April
1966, (our emphasis).
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immediately preceding years. At the same time, the new policy 
was held to be consistent with the Constitution, the Economic 
Declaration of March 28, 1963 (Dekon) and other statements of 
principle made in the past. Before the decision intellectuals 
had met to consider the formulation of suggestions to the As­
sembly. In this instance, it was the Faculty of Economics 
group which came up with concrete proposals in the form of a 
detailed draft which in many respects was incorporated into 
the final MPRS statement.
The MPRS accepted the old principle of a guided economy 
based on the Pantja Sila, arguing that policies based upon 
this principle would ensure the realization of economic demo­
cracy. The Assembly was specific in stressing that economic 
democracy should exclude:
a. "free fight liberalism" of the period 1950-1957;
b. ^tatism— where the state and its economic apparatus 
fully dominate the economy and tend to push out and 
to stifle the potential and creative powers of those 
economic units which operate outside the government 
sector;
c. monopolies which are harmful to the people.13 14
Short term problems were to be emphasized and after suc­
cess in resuscitating the economy,lif a rehabilitation and 
Stabilization program should be formulated to control inflation 
and restore production levels. The following priorities were 
listed:
a. control of inflation,
b. provision of adequate foodstuffs,
c. rehabilitation of the infra-structure,
d. an increase in activity in the export sector,
e. provision of adequate clothing (pangan— which includes 
shelter).
The Decision also made important statements on three
13. Translated from the text of the Decision published in 
Business News, July 8, 1966. The notion of the class 
struggle was rejected because the economy was to be based 
on the principle of kekeluargaan— contrasting sharply with 
the idea of the President.
14. Resuscitation (penjelematan) required overcoming stagnation 
in the production of sandang-pangan (literally food and 
clothing, but including the basic necessities of life), 
exports and bottlenecks in the infra-structure by making 
available raw materials, spare parts and the minimum of 
capital equipment for these sectors.
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issues which have been the subject of much controversy since 
independence, namely the role of the regions and private en- 
terpise in economic development and the role assigned to inter­
national economic relations. We shall discuss each of these 
in turn.
The Role of the Regions: After stressing how imperative
it was to speed up implementation of land reform and land use 
programs,15 the Assembly favored the granting of wide autonomy 
to the regions and the de-concentration of management under the 
co-ordination of regional governments.16 Even so, article 33 
of Decision XXIII provided that "in order to ensure consistency 
in the national plan, regional and community development must be 
co-ordinated by the central government" (our emphasis). Clearly, 
the old issue of the extent to which the regions are to be in­
dependent in economic matters is still unresolved. We must wait 
and see how the government tries to regulate center-regional re­
lations in practice. The basic principle to be borne in mind 
when considering regional development is that the objective is 
an integrated national economy (Decision XXIII Article 3*0.
Role of Government and Private Enterprise: The state has
little choice m  playing the leading role m  economic develop­
ment in Indonesia; the question is "shall private enterprise be 
encouraged or gradually eliminated?" This issue has always been 
a favorite topic for debate although in practice, given the 
financial weakness of the private section,17 the outcome has 
rarely been in doubt particularly since the expulsion of the
15. This should be easier than in the past, since the class 
struggle no longer has a place in Indonesian society 
according to Decision XXIII!
16. The concept of deconcentration was the subject of much dis­
cussion in 1963. Deconcentration was mentioned in the Dekon 
and a seminar was convened from July 12-18 by LEKNAS (Na­
tional Research Institute) and the MIPI (Indonesian Science 
Council) to analyze it in connection with Article 24 of the 
Declaration. Their findings were published in the Reports 
of the Workshop on Deconcentration of Management in State 
Enterprises published under the auspices of the two insti­
tutions which had organized the seminar. Two types of de­
concentration were mentioned: geographical (which is the
type referred to in the text above) and deconcentration in 
the sense of a delegation of authority within state enter­
prises .
17. This is a weakness which hampers the development of the in­
digenous private sector. Other groups, especially the 
Chinese (citizens and non-citizens) are in a much stronger 
position as we shall see later.
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Dutch in 1957-58. Even so, when the Dutch companies were taken 
over by the government part of the indigenous private community 
hoped that the government would transfer at least some of them 
to private enterprise.18 This would have been possible only if 
the government had been willing to provide substantial credits 
to the private sector (assuming of course that they had also had 
the necessary managerial skills). In fact, however, as far as 
the modern agricultural-trading-industrial sector of the economy 
was concerned, (i.e., that portion of it owned formerly by the 
Dutch), the government has shown no inclination to release its 
hold. During the period 1959-1965, the state continued to ex­
tend its influence and control over the economy, directly 
through the establishment of new industries and indirectly 
through regulations which often remained on paper only. It came 
to be said that instead of a "regulated economy," Indonesia was 
an "economy of regulations." Included in the trend towards 
greater state control (on paper) was the attempt to break the 
control of the alien traders in rural areas and the often-cited 
intention to reduce the role of private enterprise in the import 
sector.19
In Decision XXIII, the government is again assigned a posi­
tive role in overcoming economic stagnation and in economic de­
velopment. Besides carrying out economic activities through 
its own departments and enterprises, the government is obligated 
to guide (membimbing) the non-government sector (Article 38). 
Article M-0 then declares that "in performing its functions in 
the economic sector, the government must place more emphasis 
on controlling (pengawasan) the direction of economic activity 
rather than performing all activities itself.20 To this end, 
it is felt necessary to de-bureaucratise the system of control 
and provide for the deconcentration of management in state 
enterprise."21
18. For a discussion of this issue, see K. D. Thomas, op. cit. ,
pp. 116-128.
19. Sukarno referred to his intention of squeezing private im­
porters out of business in his Berdikari speech of April 
11, 1965 and in November the government announced that the 
policy would go into effect in the New Year.
20. The translation of the article presents some difficulties; 
the contrast is between pengawasaan and penguasaan. Even 
if this is not a literal translation, we think that we 
have indicated the spirit of the article.
21. In contrast to geographical deconcentration, see footnote 
16.
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Swasta (private enterprise) is to be encouraged within 
the limits provided for in the Constitution and private en­
trepreneurs are to be allowed to choose the economic sphere 
they wish to operate in provided that it does not affect the 
livelihood of the people, and is not a strategic sector.
Here, the Assembly echoes the words of Djuanda at the National 
Conference of National Businessmen (KENSI) in September 1958.22 
To complete the similarity, a Law on the sectors which will be 
open to swasta is promised by the MPRS decision. In 1958, 
Djuanda had mentioned that the forthcoming Foreign Investment 
Bill would provide a guide to the areas in which swasta could 
operate, but that Law was quickly overtaken by political 
events. In the present situation, swasta is to be under the 
guidance of the government apparatus, which is open to a wide 
variety of meanings. The Assembly does hold out the promise 
of assistance of an unspecified type to private enterprise 
but the enterprises listed are small scale.23
International Economic Relations: According to Article
58 of Decision XXIII, import policy must ensure the importing 
goods which can increase production directly or increase the 
supply of commodities required by the people, in accordance 
with an import plan (our emphasis).
The Assembly makes it clear that it accepts the argument 
that the rehabilitation and stabilization program cannot be 
a success without more foreign credits. But such credits are 
considered justifiable only as an integral of a well-defined 
program, they should not be wasted. Besides foreign credits, 
the scarcity of local capital indicates the necessity to 
attract foreign capital for development. A foreign investment 
law was therefore thought to be essential as soon as possible.
A foreign investment law should, according to the MPRS 
decision, make provision for foreign domestic capital, basi­
cally Chinese, but also Indian, Arab and the capital of other 
foreign citizens resident in Indonesia. In particular, Regula­
tion 10/1959 concerning the elimination of alien traders in 
rural areas was referred to with the comment that it should 
be brought up to date and made a law.
Finally, the MPRS recommended that Indonesia take immedi­
ate steps to return to the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
22. Discussed in K. D. Thomas, ojk cit. , p. 121.
23. Cooperatives are mentioned briefly in Decision XXIII, but 
all governments have done that in the past but the per­
formance and significance of this sector is negligible.
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Decision XXIII is different in spirit from the trend of 
the previous two years, as in its acceptance of foreign in­
vestment and the decision to return to various international 
organizations for example. Private enterprise is also to be 
encouraged to play a more active role in the economy in con­
trast to the stated ideals in the period between September 
1963 and February 1966.24 But even so, since the phrasing of 
the sections in Decision XXIII on the role of private enter­
prise is very similar to earlier promises profferred to the 
private sector at least until September 1963, the real signif­
icance of the latest pronouncements will only be realized in 
implementation. And we must always bear in mind what we have 
already said about the financial position of the indigenous 
private entrepreneurs, which will obviously limit their role 
in practice. Similarly, the promise of more autonomy to the 
regions has been made before.
Comparisons between the principles embodied in the MPRS 
decision and those enunciated by various governments since 
independence would be instructive. Here we merely wish to 
concentrate our attention on one particular period for com­
parative purposes. The Dekon of March 1963 is very similar 
in many respects to Decision XXIII and the events leading up 
to the Dekon have important parallels to the sequence of events 
since March 1966. In the period from August 1962 to May 1963, 
the Djuanda cabinet, having settled the West Irian dispute, 
was able to make preparations for a serious approach to economic 
problems. Uppermost in the mind of the government at that time 
was the necessity for Western aid and the IMF sent advisers to 
Indonesia to assist in the drafting of an economic program. A 
Western consortium seemed likely to back the government's 
policies and an amount of $250 million dollars was rumored as 
the first step. The Dekon was announced on March 28, 1963 as 
the basic strategy of the government. Like Decision XXIII it 
was a product of compromise between various pressure groups.
When the government announced its "14 regulations in implementa­
tion of the Dekon" opposition from the Nationalist Party and 
the PKI was formulated in such a way that the government's 
policies were alleged to be a betrayal of the Dekon! This 
is why, in commenting on the Decision of the MPRS we have 
stressed that only concrete regulations on the various topics 
discussed will enable us to form a clear picture of the direc­
tion in which the new order tends to travel.
Decision XXIII and a short-term program: Besides enunci­
ating broad principles, the MPRS also stressed that the
24-. The divergence between the stated policy and the actual 
reality concerning the scope for private enterprise has 
been ably presented by Castles, ojd. cit., pp. 32-38.
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government should concentrate its attention on a short-term 
program of resuscitation, stabilization and rehabilitation.
The Indonesian economists had presented the MPRS with a de­
tailed draft of "Basic Objectives." In its turn, the MPRS 
requested the economists to outline a short-term program along 
the lines suggested in Decision XXIII. In their conference in 
Bandung in July, the economists’ association (ISEI) proposed 
to the government the following program:
1. a six-month resuscitation program aimed at reducing 
inflationary pressures,
2. a two year stabilization program continuing the 
resuscitation program, but more intensively,
3. a one year program aimed at the rehabilitation of 
the industrial apparatus, including the repair of 
roads, factories and agricultural estates.25
Since the rehabilitation program was to be put into prac- 
tice after the two year stabilization program, the time-span 
envisaged for the whole program was 3\ years. 6
The Cabinet and Guide-lines of Policy
In the middle of August, the newly appointed Ampera cabinet 
announced its own program for realizing the twin objectives of 
stabilization and rehabilitation based on Decision XIII. Prob­
ably drawing upon the ideas of the economists, the government 
decided upon a four-phase program: 1) resuscitation, 2) re­
habilitation, 3) consolidation, and 4) stabilization, each 
phase being of six months duration. This two-year program is 
equivalent to the period allowed the cabinet by the MPRS for 
holding elections, i.e., not later than July 5, 1968.27 The 
government apparently considers the success of its program as 
vital to the creation of the economic stability which it regards 
as a prerequisite for political stability. A favorable climate 
for the elections is considered to be dependent on achievement
25. Compare this program with the short-term program outlined 
in the Dekon. Again the similarities are striking.
26. The complete text of the program is published in Business 
News, August 12 and 15, 1966. We will not discuss their 
proposals further, but suggest that as the government issues 
regulations on economic policy reference be made to the docu­
ment to assess the impact of the ISEI ideas on policy makers.
27. MPRS, Decision XI, July 11, 1966.
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of stability in both spheres.
By stage (4), the period of stabilization begins and the 
way is open for a development program. But politically, fears 
have been expressed about the effects of the preparations and 
campaigning for the forthcoming elections. In a Business News 
editorial, for example, the program is regarded as modest and 
is said to convey the impression that the Ampera cabinet is 
merely taking responsibility for the holding of elections under 
tranquil conditions.28 Only in stage (3), or eighteen months 
after the program has been in progress, will the nine essential 
commodities be available in what are considered to be reasonable 
quantities, and in phase (4) the attempt is to be made to cut 
the rate of inflation by 50 per cent. Given the present rate 
of inflation, that is hardly likely to engender political sta­
bility. Inflation will therefore continue to be a serious prob­
lem over the next two years, according to the governments own 
calculations, and it is unlikely that much will have been accom­
plished before the rush for electioneering funds gets underway. 
The implications of this situation for the success of the 
fourth phase of the program are clear.
A major statement of policy was presented to a group of 
Indonesia’s creditors in Tokyo on September 17.29 The new 
government indirectly criticized "strict" planning and declared 
itself in favor of the "removal of distortions caused by these 
controls, bothersome procedures and undue state interference 
(resulting from planning), and which are in a sense correlated 
features of inflation, (which) requires a drastic reversal of 
policies by letting a more normal operation of market forces. 
Decontrol of the economy and of the pricing system "will enable 
the government to base its revenue on more realistic prices and 
will certainly improve results." One of the most important 
single steps in facilitating decontrol was, according to the 
government, to be the introduction of a realistic exchange rate. 
State enterprises would be allowed to operate on a more realistic 
pricing system which would enable them to charge higher prices 
and reduce their inefficiency. This would make it possible for 
the government to reduce their subsidies and enable the compan­
ies to contribute more to the budget. If the enterprises lacked
28. Business News, August 24, 1966. This section is based on
the Business News report of General Suharto’s comments on 
the government’sprogram, and includes part of the pene­
trating analysis of the program in the Business News editorial.
29. An IMF team was already in Indonesia assisting the govern­
ment in preparations of a short-term stabilization program, 
and Suharto acknowledged in Fund’s assistance in drawing
up the September 17 statement.
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able managers, General Suharto said that they might be able 
to attract foreign personnel. He also said that prices should 
develop in line with production efficiencies within the limits 
of lfsocially permissible profit-making.11 To this end, the 
government will abolish preferential treatment to State enter­
prises covering a very wide variety of cases.
More concretely, the chairman of the Presidium said that 
the government would intensify its tax collecting efforts and 
would also introduce new taxes.30 The objective was to increase 
government revenue to 10 per cent of the National Income com­
pared with an estimated 1.5 per cent in 1965. "Strict plan­
ning," to use General Suharto1s phrase, may be dispensed with 
but it is clear from Decision XXIII that planning as such is 
not condemned. If the government does succeed in increasing 
its revenue, it should be in a much better position to influ­
ence the direction of the economy than has been possible be­
fore. It may prefer, however, to rely on market forces rather 
than on the more direct methods employed with little success by 
previous governments.
Economic Policy Measures
The most important steps taken by the Ampera Cabinet since 
it took office in July have been the introduction of new export 
and import regulations in October and the tabling of a draft 
budget for 1967 and of a foreign investment bill on November 17. 
Before we discuss these measures, we must first take a look at 
how the government prepared the way for these important measures, 
particularly in its search for foreign exchange and its taxation 
policy pronouncements.
Preparations for the October Regulations
Foreign exchange position: In his first major economic
speech, the Sultan had made it clear that the economic situa­
tion was serious. He emphasized then that export earnings had
30. The land tax was cited as a major source of revenue in the 
future, although it is not mentioned in the 1967 budget as 
we shall see below. It is interesting to speculate on the 
effects of any attempt to collect the land tax on the out­
come of the proposed elections. A tax on agricultural pro­
ducts (padjak hasil bumi) is still being collected but in the 
1967 budget the revenue from this tax (now called the re­
gional development collection— iuran pembangunan daerah) is 
only Rp.2 million or less than 3 per cent of total revenue 
(see Table 1).
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fallen in recent years and that it was impossible for the govern­
ment to finance the imports required for a rehabilitation pro­
gram,. and repay foreign debts as well.31 The government there­
fore decided to attempt to persuade its creditors to agree to 
a moratorium and rescheduling of debt payment. Rapid moves 
were made to reassure its creditors of the seriousness of the 
government’s intention to tackle economic matters. Statements 
were made to the effect that confrontation would soon be brought 
to an end, and on June 6, 1966 Indonesia affected a rapproche­
ment with Singapore followed on August 11, 1966 by a similar 
agreement with Malaysia. Decision XXIII reversed the former 
hostile attitude towards foreign investment and the announcement 
that Indonesia would seek readmission to international monetary 
organizations was quickly acted upon with the dispatch of a dele­
gation to the IMF and the IBRD in Washington.
The total amount of Indonesia’s foreign debts has been esti­
mated at around $2.3 billion of which some 60 per cent is owing 
to Communist countries (42 per cent to the Soviet Union alone).
By 1967, the amount of repayment including arrears is estimated 
at $727.9 million. No data has been made available on the pro­
portion owing to Communist countries, but if we take the per­
centage distribution of the total debt as a guide,32 $436 million 
would be outstanding to them"] Missions were sent to both Western 
and Communist countries to explain the government’s policies, and
31. We have already indicated elsewhere that we concur in this 
analysis, but several statements made subsequently by various 
ministers seem to indicate a misunderstanding of the nature of 
the export problem. General Suharto, in his statement to
the Tokyo meeting in September referred to an increase in ex­
port earnings between 1958 and 1960, and cites this increase 
as an indication of the efficacy of stricter monetary con­
trols. Export earnings did increase in those years from $476 
million to $620 million (excluding oil). Between the same 
period, the export value of rubber, the most important ex­
port product, rose from $262 to $377 million, an increase 
of 44 per cent. At the same time, export volume fell from a 
total of 685,198 tons to 610,452 tons. It was the increase 
in the price of rubber on the world market rather than any 
internal policy measures which was responsible for the in­
crease in exports noted by General Suharto, see K. D. Thomas 
and J. Panglaykim, ’’Indonesian Exports: Performance and
Prospects, 1950-1970, Part I,” Bulletin of Indonesian 
Economic Studies, Australian National University, No. 5, 
October 1966; also will be published as booklet by the 
Rotterdam University Press, April 1967.
32. A list of Indonesia’s total foreign debts can be found in 
J. Panglaykim, H. W. Arndt, The Indonesian Economy: Facing 
a New Era?, Rotterdam University Press, November 1966,
Table I.
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to seek new credits. The Sultan led a team to Japan at the end 
of May5 then in September he went to Europe where he met, among 
others, representatives of the British and Dutch governments.
His purpose in both cases was to discuss the settling of claims 
for compensation for firms taken over by the Indonesian govern­
ment. An agreement was reached in Holland that Indonesia 
would pay compensation of approximately $165 million (FI. 600 
million) commencing in 1971 at 1 per cent interest spread out 
over 30 years. In Britain the matter was left open, representa­
tives of the British firms concerned being invited to Indonesia 
to discuss the matter further.
The meeting of creditors in Tokyo was regarded as the cru­
cial test but the outcome was rather disappointing. In a state­
ment in Parliament, the government had indicated that for its 
economic program imports to the value of $590 million were re­
quired and given the expected level of exports for that year 
further credits of $250 million would be sought as well as the 
moratorium and rescheduling.33 No decision was reached con­
cerning new credits but there was an agreement in principle on 
a moratorium and rescheduling. But the countries concerned34 
decided to postpone the formulation of a timetable on a mora­
torium and rescheduling until December when they agreed to meet 
again in Paris. The Sultan reported that the possibility of new 
credits would also be discussed at the Paris talks.35
33. Monitored radio broadcast, September 17. In its statement 
presented in Tokyo on the same day, the government mentioned 
an amount of $350 million extra credit. Both amounts seem 
excessive if imports are estimated at $590 million and ex­
ports for 1967 at the $450 million quoted in Business News, 
September 21, 1966.
34. Japan, the United States, Western Germany, France, Holland, 
Italy, the United Kingdom; Australia and New Zealand and 
Canada as observers-small creditors. Commenting on the ab­
sence of the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, the 
government stated in Parliament that efforts were still be­
ing made to come to an agreement with them concerning a re­
scheduling of debts, see Business News, September 19, 1966.
35. It is interesting to follow the timing of the meetings of 
the creditor countries in relation to Indonesia1s approaches 
to the Soviet Union. Foreign Minister Malik was due to meet 
Soviet leaders in early September but at the last minute the 
talks were put off until some time in October, i.e., after 
and not before Tokyo as originally planned. It is therefore 
possible that the Tokyo club preferred to agree to a mora­
torium-rescheduling in principle in September promising 
more concrete proposals after the Russians had declared 
their policy on the issue of their much larger debts. Sub­
sequently, the USSR also agreed to a moratorium in principle
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In spite of the results of the Tokyo meeting, the missions 
of the Sultan and Foreign Minister in May and September 1966 
did produce concrete offers of credits. However, we have been 
unable to ascertain the precise amount available, official fig­
ures varying within a range of $174 million and $286.8 mil­
lion*36 37 Taken together, the acceptance of a moratorium in 
principle, including the arrears up to the end of 1966, and the 
availability of some credits which would be used currently 
meant that the immediate pressures occasioned by the scarcity 
of foreign exchange were eased considerably. The effects of 
the reduced pressures were evident in the form which the Octo­
ber regulations took as we shall see below.
Taxation policy: General Suharto announced the govern­
ment’s intention of raising revenue by intensifying the col­
lection of such direct taxes as income, property, sales, and 
company profit taxes on September 20.3' General Suharto said 
that the government must try to increase revenue from direct 
taxes because expenditures were far in excess of receipts. In 
July 1966, he pointed out that the money supply was Rp.10 
billion (new money) compared with Rp.2.8 billion (new money) 
seven months earlier. Reduction of the budget deficit was a 
way to prevent further increase of that magnitude he said.
Most of Indonesia’s tax revenue has, in the past, come 
from indirect taxes levied on the foreign trade sector, where­
as there had been little success in collecting scheduled taxes
but again nothing more definite. This cat-and-mouse game 
between the creditor nations is partly responsible for the 
delay in the granting of sizeable rather than piece-meal 
credits to Indonesia, and may, in the not-too-long run, 
seriously affect the success of the government’s economic 
program and exacerbate the internal political tensions.
36. The Minister of Finance gave a figure of $174 million, of 
which $100.8 million had already been allocated (Business 
News, October 19, 1966); (2) The Public Relations Section 
of the First Minister for Finance and Economics gave a 
figure of $220 million of which $180.35 million was avail­
able for 1966 (Business News, October 21, 1966); and (3) 
the Sultan, in a statement in Parliament on October 24, 
1966 (monitored broadcast) mentioned $286.8 million. He 
comments on several of the credits, some of which are ear­
marked for special projects including the $30 million loan 
from Holland for West Irian, $2 million from France for 
Djatiluhur and $2.5 million from Japan for the flood vic­
tims of Solo.
37. For the text of this statement see Business News special 
news sheet, September 20, and Presidium Instruction No. 
10/EK/IN/1966, Business News, September 23, 1966.
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from incomes, property and profits. As the Presidium chairman 
pointed out, the government's tax drive would mainly affect 
businessmen, companies and high officials, groups which had 
consistently succeeded in their efforts at tax evasion. But 
in stressing the fact that the rakjat (the general public) 
would;not be affected, he gave an impetus to the already low 
esteem in which the business community, including government 
enterprises, is held.
The main targets of the tax collectors would be the cities 
and those persons who paid their taxes would be given a tax 
certificate as proof of payment. General Suharto realized 
that tax officials might encounter difficulties in the perform­
ance of their duties because the groups affected had consid­
erable influence in the community, but he warned that those 
who tried to evade paying their taxes would be dealt with firm­
ly.38 Difficulties other than those mentioned by General Su­
harto will have to be faced in the effort to increase taxation. 
More skilled and honest personnel may be required and it may 
be necessary to pay them an "adequate" salary, a rather com­
plicated task if the rate of inflation is not reduced. Prob­
ably, an added incentive in the form of a bonus system would 
help.
We are now in a position to discuss the implications of 
the October 3 regulations (and the follow-up measures) and 
the Budget for 1967 both as component parts of the stabiliza­
tion and rehabilitation program and as measures designed to 
further the government's policy objectives in such matters as 
regional and central government roles in development and the 
respective roles of private and state enterprises.
The October Regulations and the Budget
On February 11, 1966, the Dwikora cabinet had introduced 
the export certificate system (Bonus Ekspor— B. E.) which with 
modifications is still in operation. Under this system, the 
exporter receives an income from a combination of:
1. the rupiah he receives from the Foreign Exchange Fund 
for that portion of his exchange earnings which he is obliged 
to surrender to the government to be converted at the official 
rate (now Rp.10 = $1);
2. the rupiah which he receives from the sale of that por­
tion of this foreign exchange earnings which he receives in 
the form of an exchange certificate (BE);
38. Tax officials could call upon the Armed Forces to assist 
them if necessary. See Presidium Instruction mentioned in 
note 37.
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3. the foreign currency which he obtains as a result of 
the difference between the check price (as fixed by the Depart­
ment of Trade, Export Division) for his product fixed in for­
eign currency by the government and surrendered to the Foreign 
Exchange Fund and the actual price he gets from the foreign 
buyer. This portion is known as the DP-A and the exporter can 
deposit it in an overseas bank or sell it or part of it to 
those who need foreign currency (it then becomes a DP-B and 
legally it cannot be traded again. The rate for the DP-A is 
usually very close to the black rate for the rupiah, sometimes 
higher sometimes lower).
The Ampera Cabinet announced on October 3, 1966 a series 
of Presidium Decisions affecting foreign trade sector. These 
new measures, issued at a time when the top ministers for eco­
nomic affairs were overseas,39 provided for changes in the 
spheres of both exports and imports.
Exports; The regulations on October 3 provided for an 
increase m  the percentage of foreign exchange granted to the 
exporter in the form of BE as compared with the percentages 
fixed on May 20:
Group I (including rubber, copra, coffee) from 20 to 50%
Group II from 60 to 75%
Group III 100% as before*40 41
In total, the amount of foreign exchange available as exchange 
certificates to exporters (BE-E) has been estimated at 65%.
Of the rest, 10% is allocated to the First Level Autonomous 
Regions (Dati I) as an automatic foreign exchange allocation 
(ADO). The regions are obliged to purchase this foreign ex­
change from the Foreign Exchange Fund at a price of Rp.10 = $1.
39. Both the Sultan and Adam Malik, the Foreign Minister, were 
abroad discussing Indonesia’s foreign exchange position with 
her creditors. At the moment, we are not sure whether the 
timing of the October regulations is significant, but a 
Business News editorial was also prompted to mention the 
absence of these ministers in its issue of October 5, 1966. 
The new regulations are published in the same edition.
40. For a complete list of the commodities in each group see 
Kompas, October 8, 1966.
41. Mentioned in Business News, October 5, 1966. We do not 
know the basis on which this estimate was calculated. We 
did however make a calculation of our own which gave a 
figure of 55%. In this latter case, commodities in group 
I accounted for 88% of total exports. We will use the B.
N. estimates until we have more information.
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The remaining 25% goes directly into the Foreign Exchange Fund.
As a result of these changes, the initial distribution of 
foreign exchange from exports is:
1. Bonus Ekspor to the exporter (BE-E) 65%
2. Automatic Foreign Exchange Allocation to Dati I (ADO) 10%
3. Foreign Exchange Fund 25%
The government also decided to sell its own foreign ex­
change from (3) as BE, and at the same time the regional govern­
ments *were allowed to sell the foreign exchange certificates 
from their ADO to importers as Regional B.E. (BE-D).42
One other source of foreign exchange certificates was 
created by the government in the October regulations when it 
decided to sell foreign credits in the same way as foreign ex­
change from the government’s Foreign Exchange Fund. These for­
eign credits will therefore become BE-K. So there are now four 
different types of exchange certificates: (1) B.E.-E. , (2)
B.E .-D., (3) BE-K, and (4) B.E. ex Foreign Exchange Fund.
The rates of the BE-E and BE-D are to be determined in the 
open market by the forces of supply and demand, whereas prior 
to the October regulations such certificates were sold through 
the Central Bank. Under the old system, the importers submit­
ted their bids to the Central Bank and once a week foreign 
exchange was allocated by auction. With the October measures, 
importers can purchase whatever they require in the open mar­
ket at any time.
Exchange certificates of types (3) and (4) are to be sold 
by the government through the Bank Negara Indonesia (Central 
Bank) at rates to be determined periodically by the government. 
In this way, the government expects to be able to influence 
the rate of the BE from all sources.
Imports: Import groupings and their respective customs
duties remained as before but the rate at which the duties are 
to be levied is increased from a rate of Rp.10 = $1, to Rp.75. 
This new rate could according to the regulation be revised 
quarterly.
As under the old system, certain restrictions were re­
tained on the types of goods which could be imported with 
foreign exchange certificates:43
42. We are following Business News terminology.
43. The lists of the goods in the various categories are as 
follows: (i) Presidential Instruction Aa/D/31/1966 of 
February 26, 1966 in Business News, March 24, 1966; (ii)
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(1) BE-E, BE-D, BE-ex Foreign Exchange Fund can be used 
to import goods in categories I, II and III;
(2) ADO can be used by the regional governments only for 
imports which are required to rehabilitate and improve the 
infra-structure;
(3) BE-K can be used in theory to import the same goods 
as in category (1), but in practice will be subject to the 
availability of goods in the country providing the credit.
The 1967 Budget: Although the Budget was not tabled in
Parliament until November 17, we will consider the revenues 
side of it here because in this respect the budget is based 
upon the changes instituted in the October 3 measures. More­
over, because the budget is dependent on the successful im­
plementation of those regulations, when we consider their 
impact on the economy we can also assess the possible effects 
of current trends on budgeted revenues.
Government revenues for 1967 are presented in Table I. 
Prior to the introduction of the budget, various members of 
the government had made numerous statements concerning the 
necessity to increase revenues from direct taxes and a tax 
drive was begun to ensure that such taxes were collected. 
References were also made to the land tax as an important 
source of revenue in the future. A great deal of preparation 
will be required before a suitable land tax can be levied, in 
the meantime the 1967 budget clearly adheres to the old pat­
tern of a dependence on indirect taxes.
A balanced budget was brought down with revenues and 
expenditures at Rp.81,300 million. The major sources of reve­
nues are: *27
1. Customs Duties Rp. 9,063 m.
2. Sale of foreign exchange from exports Rp. 14,230 m.
3. Sale of credits from foreign countries Rp. 29,500 m.
4. Company tax Rp. 6,950 m.
5. Sales tax Rp. 7,000 m.6. Excise on tobacco Rp. 6,075 m.
Rp. 70,868 m.
Instruction No. 105/M/SK/1964, of April 22, 1964 cited 
in October 3 regulations on "Changes in the Amount of 
Exchange Certificate”. The list is in Business News, April
27, 1964. These restrictions on the types of goods which 
can be imported contrast with the statement by H.W.A. that 
"importers seemed in practice to be free to buy what they 
wished”, "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin of Indo­
nesian Economic Studies, No. 5, October 1966,'p. "
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Table I
Indonesia's 1967 - Budget Revenues 
(in million rupiah)
Revenue









Transfer motorized vehicles 24-0




Excise + Duties 
Import:
Foreign Exch. realization 1967 6,075
Foreign Exch. realization 1966 783
Surtax on Import duties 1967 1,012
Surtax on Import duties 1966 97







Alcohol (Kersone P.M.) 52
II. Regional Development Collection* 
III. Sales of Foreign Exchange from export 
(Group 1-13,770, 11-460, Ill-nil)
IV. Foreign Credit: (Rescheduling repayment 













Source: BN No. 1427,1429, Monitoring 17-11-66,30-11-66 and 
FEER 1-12-66: compiled by Dahlan Talib.
* Iuran Pembangunan Daerah, the previous tax on agricultural 
products, see above p 87. The revenue from this tax is to 
be transferred to the region in which it is collected.
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Revenues from the foreign trade sector amount to Rp.57,793 
million, of which only the custom duties are not directly de­
pendent on the sale of foreign exchange certificates.1*1* The 
sales of such certificates from items (2), (3) and (4)1*5 amount 
to $487 million and for budgetary purposes the certificates 
are valued at Rp.100 = $1. The actual value of the exchange 
certificates is therefore the vital factor in the budgeted rev­
enues; if the rate falls below Rp.100 a budget deficit is pos­
sible.
The Impact of the Regulations
The Role of the Regions
The October measures provided the First Level Autonomous 
Regions (DATI I) with 10 percent of total foreign exchange 
earnings in the form of an "automatic foreign exchange alloca­
tion" (ADO), under conditions explained in the last section.
The export target for 1967 was estimated at $450 million,1*6 
so the regional governments would get $45 million at a cost 
of Rp.450 million. Part of this amount could be used to cover 
the rupiah cost, i.e., $4.50 million at a rate of Rp.100. If 
they kept $24.3 million (60%) for their own import requirements, 
the sale of the remainder as B.E.-D would give them a revenue 
of Rp.1,620 million at the rate of Rp.100 = $1.
If we take South Sumatra (excluding Dati I Lampong) as an 
example, we can assess the significance of the new regulation 
more easily. Confining ourselves to smallholder rubber exports 
from the region, which average 25% of smallholder rubber, the 456
44. The indirect dependence of customs duties on the sale of 
BE should not be overlooked, however. At the same time, 
it is also important to note that revenue from the tobacco 
excise is also affected by developments in the foreign trade 
sector, to the extent that imported materials are required 
for the production of cigarettes.
45. Of the total companies tax of Rp.6,950 million, the oil 
companies are expected to contribute $50 million which are 
to be sold as exchange certificates (presumably ex Foreign 
Exchange Fund) at a rate of Rp.100 (see Business News, 
December 21, 1966). Incidentally, it is worth noting how 
small the company tax on indigenous enterprises is.
46. See Business News, September 21, 1966 and statement by 
Minister of Trade in a monitored Radio Republic Indonesia 
broadcast January 17, 1967.
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value of such exports for South Sumatra in 1964- was approxi­
mately $34.3 million. After paying the Foreign Exchange Fund 
Rp.343 million and recovering the cost by the sale of BE-D, 
the regional authorities would have $3,087 million at its 
disposal. Assuming as before that the region kept 60% for its 
own imports, it could sell the remaining $1,235 million for 
Rp.128.5 million. Antara reports that the total budget for 
the province is Rp.46 million, so the income from rubber alone 
far exceeds the rupiah made available in the budget without 
taking into account the foreign exchange revenue.1*7 Appar­
ently, there is considerable debate in South Sumatra on how 
to use the foreign exchange from the ADO efficiently. It is 
unlikely that this region, or any other, has detailed plans 
to cope with the new foreign exchange allocation.1*8 The MPRS 
made it clear that regional planning must not be in conflict 
with national development, but in the absence of a national 
plan a calculation on this basis is out of the question. In 
the past, foreign exchange was controlled by the central gov­
ernment but it would be impossible to assert that it was al­
located in accordance with rational economic principles.
But the decision to give the regions greater control over 
their own exchange earnings may not lead to a more rational 
allocation of resources if the regions in their turn have no 
planned set of priorities. Regional sentiments may be assuag­
ed but rationality may not be served.
The increase in exchange allocation to the regional gov­
ernments was accompanied by a Presidium decision concerning 
the appropriate authorities delegated to regulate the export 
sector. In particular, all regional authorities, both civil 
and military, were prohibited from issuing export regulations 
and instructions. Furthermore, they were also ordered to re­
frain from collecting taxes on enterprises and agricultural 
products in the export sector without the permission of the 
central government.
The levying of taxes without the consent of the central 
government has been increasing over the years and levies have 
been imposed not only by the Dati I governments but at lower 
levels of regional government (civil and military) as well.1*9 4789
47. Antara, December 4, 1966. The same source reported that 
in the first 40 days after the October regulation South 
Sumatra had already been allocated $584,000.
48. We reserve judgement on the Mokoginta plan for Sumatra (North only?) because we have not yet seen it.
49. We are assuming that the levying of such taxes has always 
been illegal, the central government acquiescing only be­
cause it was unable to prevent such exactions. For the 
lower levels of government, the trading channels have been
98
Some indication of the extent of the extra taxes can be seen 
in the report of a team sent to North Sumatra to ascertain the 
effects of the new regulations. Two major Dati I taxes were 
being levied in connection with the Mokoginta plan: (1) Rp.10
in the $ on exports payable to the Inter-Regional Command, and 
(2) Rp.l per $ on exports for regional welfare. It was estima­
ted that for the whole of Sumatra, with exports at $210 million, 
a total of Rp.'462 million could be collected. Besides that, 
four other regional levies were mentioned, all of which could 
have to be abolished under the Presidium decision. In return, 
Sumatra would, on the basis of the $210 million mentioned 
above, get $21 million. If 40 percent were to be sold as BE-D 
at Rp.100 = $, the amount available for regional development 
would be Rp.796 million, three times the current levies.50
The principles underlying the present kind of export in­
centive are by no means new in Indonesia, and it is interesting 
to remember the effects of a similar instruction applied to
the most lucrative source of revenue, adding to the "hid­
den costs" of trade. The implication of this analysis is 
that the central government has, in the past, been unable 
to prevent such exactions in the regions. Our research 
into the remilling industry in South Sumatra in 1965 indi­
cated that certain levies imposed by the regional govern­
ment were declared illegal in mid-1964. A regulation is­
sued by the central government in September 1965 included 
a clause stipulating that the levies prohibited in the pre­
vious regulation were not to be collected any more— evi­
dence that the regions had ignored the earlier request.
The problem of government control over the regions is one 
which the new order will have to face. The re-allocation 
of foreign exchange earnings in the manner provided for in 
the October regulations may contain some inconsistencies, 
but it may be a step in the direction of better relations 
between the center and regions. In the meantime, there 
have been rumors that some regions are not satisfied with 
the new arrangements, Atjeh, for example, requesting an 
allocation of foreign exchange from oil. And there are 
reports of an increase in smuggling to Singapore. Further­
more, the article on regional levies by Dr. Emil Salim 
(An tar a 19.1.67) seems to indicate that the October 3 pro-i 
hibition on regional taxes in the export sector is not 
being implemented. Such developments are not encouraging.
50. This report on the Sumatra survey was given by the Director 
General of Development and Marketing, Department of Trade, 
see Business News, October 26, 1966. We are inclined to 
believe that the amount mentioned for Sumatra as a whole 
is too low;, but it could be the amount for North Sumatra.
On taxes collected in other areas in Sumatra see Business 
News, December 16, 1966.
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the regions in 1957 by Prime Minister Djuanda. The provisions 
of the current regulations are much more favorable than those 
of the Export Certificate system (Bukti Ekspor— also abbrevia­
ted to BE) introduced in June 1957~ A regional revolt then 
seemed imminent and the government brought in the new system 
in an attempt to avert civil war. Even so, the government re­
fused to surrender its control over foreign exchange, offering 
the exporters an exchange certificate which, because the rate 
was to be determined in the open market, guaranteed them a 
rupiah income in a period of severe inflation and low exchange 
reserves and imports.51
Under the new system, the regional authorities not only 
get a foreign exchange allocation, but indirectly receive a 
considerable amount of rupiah also. In effect, the October 
instruction satisfies the MPRS Decision which requested that 
special attention be directed towards the financial relations 
between the central government and the regions (Article 33 (c)). 
A separate law may be enacted eventually, but it is probable 
that it will be similar in principle to the provisions of the 
present regulations, because the foreign trade sector is the 
most important source of wealth in the regions outside Java.
But in the absence of detailed national and regional plans, it 
could be argued that coordination between national and regional 
development is jeopardised. Restricting the regional authori­
ties as to the way in which their foreign exchange is to be 
used is helpful, but it can only be regarded as a provisional 
measure until more concrete proposals are formulated by the 
central and regional governments.52
Economic Trends Since the October Regulations
Throughout September, the rate for exchange certificates 
(BE-E) had fluctuated considerably, and even as late as Sep­
tember 22 it was Rp.128. The decline in the latter part of 
the month was undoubtedly due to calculations made by importers 
on the likely effects of Indonesia's re-entry into the UN, and 
her coming membership of the I.M.F. and I.B.R.D. and the Asian 
Development Bank. Rumors of new credits from the United States 
also stimulated the pressures for a lower rate. If the importer 
bought BE-E at high prices in September and new credits were 
then made available from overseas, the certainty that imports
51. At that time, however, exports were over $900 m. for each 
of the three years 1955-1957 and imports were much higher 
than they have been over the last three years.
52. MPRS Decision XXI on the granting of "as much autonomy as 
possible" to the regions (seluas-luasnja) is no less vague 
than Decision XXIII on this issue.
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would increase considerably could result in heavy losses for 
those who had purchased the high-priced BE-E. There were also 
signs, even at this early date, that cash was scarce53 and 
the tax drive was beginning to take its effect on the market. 
Those in a position to buy BE-E were often unwilling to do so 
for fear of being asked questions about the source of their 
funds by the Taxation Department. Both speculators and bona- 
fide businessmen were affected in this way, and some believed 
that whereas speculators might escape the net, the legitimate 
businessmen might not. 5*
Exports and the BE: The increase in the percentage of
total exports which was to be sold on the market as exchange 
certificates from export proceeds (B.E.-Eksport or BE-E) to 
importers re-enforced the factors which were pushing the BE-E 
down at the end of September. While it is true that the gov­
ernment also announced on October 3 that credits received from 
foreign countries would also be sold as BE (BE-Kredit or BE-K), 
this could hardly have affected the market immediately because 
no credits were made available at the time. It was not until 
October 25 that the Government declared that $48 million of 
credits (from Holland, Pakistan, India and West Germany) were 
to be released as BE-K in the near future. The Indian credits 
were scheduled for release on November 15 but by that time the 
new system was faced with stagnation in the trading sector 
which may be partly the result of the effects of the implemen­
tation of the regulations themselves.55
During October, the BE-E rate fell dramatically dragging 
other foreign exchange rates down with it including the black 
market rates for foreign currencies. In the first week of 
October, the BE-E rate fell from Rp.119 to Rp.105 and on the 
11th it was below Rp.100. By the end of the month it was down 
to Rp.82.50. According to reports in Business News, these low 
rates do not tell* the whole story. As the rate fell, buyers 
did not react favorably and even at a rate of Rp.82.50 demand 
was apparently sluggish.
A fall in the BE-E rate was expected, given that the amount 
of certificates was to be increased. Even if exports remained 
at the same level a fall in the rate was still most probable 
because of the increases in the percentages in each export 
group which were convertible into BE-E, and also because the
53. See Business News, October 3, 1966, pp. 13-14.
54. Ibid., p. 16.
55. One aspect was the tight money policy of the Central Bank 
which was discussed by Business News in its editorial 
MLimits of Tight Money Policy**, 19-12-6 6.
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government was going to sell exchange from its Foreign Ex­
change Fund. More than that, the government itself would be 
able to exercise a certain degree of control over the rate be­
cause it was also prepared to buy BE-E in the open market if 
necessary.56 In this case, the Foreign Exchange Fund would 
be assuming a new role: that of exercising a controlling in­
fluence on the rate.
There was a considerable amount of conjecture as to the 
rate at which the certificates would stabilize. In the mid­
dle of November when the government presented its budget the 
rate was fluctuating between Rp.85-90. Yet the government 
itself seemed to be confident that it could conduct its open 
market operations in such a way that the rate would be at least 
Rp.100 throughout the coming year. All the items in the bud­
get which are affected by the rate of exchange certificate 
are, as we have seen calculated at the rate of Rp.100; a point 
of no little significance considering that over 50 percent 
of government revenues depend on the sale of these certifi­
cates. Moreover, since the government has announced that there 
will be no supplementary budget57 it is difficult to avoid the 
conclusion that the government has committed itself to the Rp. 
100 rate. Even so, as late as December 20, the management of 
the Bank Negara Indonesia (the Bank which is temporarily as­
signed the task of handling the exchange certificates), said 
that the Bankfs policy in determining the rate of certificates 
to be sold from the Foreign Exchange Fund or from foreign 
credits would be based on the three functions of the exchange 
certificates, which are:
(1) to enable exporters to eliminate the price disparity 
and give them a profit;
(2) to be attractive enough to importers so that they can 
make a profit;
(3) to act as a source of revenue for the government.58
56. This point was made by Drs. Kaptin Adisumarto in the second 
of three articles on the new regulations in Kom^as, October 
7-8-10, 1966. So far, we have been unable to find other 
references to the effect that the government was contemplat­
ing buying as well as selling exchange certificates but,
as we shall see below, this is in fact what the government 
did in mid-November.
57. Statement by the Sultan before Parliament on November 17, 
see Business News, November 18, 1966.
This statement was made in reply to a series of questions 
put to the Bank by a Business News correspondent, see B.N., 
No. 143a, December, 1966.
58.
102
The exporters will want as high a rate as possible, while the 
importers will want a low rate. If only these two factors were 
involved, the rate would be determined by the relative strengths 
of the two parties. But there is also the government to con­
sider and, having fulfilled the task required of it by MPRS 
Decision XXIII in producing a balanced budget, it must a priori. 
sell certificates at a rate of Rp.100. We are therefore unable 
to understand the assessment of the situation as presented by 
the Bank Negara Indonesia; the government has much less room 
to maneuver than it assumes. If the rate falls below Rp.100, 
the unfavorable effects on the budget could be offset if the 
government were able to obtain more foreign credits than have 
been budgeted for.59
Through the early weeks of November, the BE-E rate remained 
below Rp.100. By November 11, the free market rate was Rp.81, 
having recovered from a low of Rp.76 on November 2. The al­
ternate governor of the Central Bank announced on November 9 
that the following week the government would begin selling BE- 
ex Foreign Exchange Fund "effectively." The rates announced 
each week since early October had been for administrative pur­
poses only or for old contracts.60 Then on November 12 the 
government declared that commencing on November 1*+ it would 
begin to buy BE-E and BE-D at a price of Rp.8H.50 and that 
future rates would be determined periodically. And on the same 
day, the governor of the Bank Negara Indonesia said that the 
Bank would begin to sell Indian credits at Rp.85.61 Taken
59. But even if more credits are forthcoming, there is no 
guarantee that the government will be able to sell them 
as we shall see later.
60. Business News, November 11, 1966.
61. As we have already mentioned, the government is going to
sell two types of exchange certificates: a) those origi­
nating from the Foreign Exchange Fund, and b) those coming 
from foreign credits. In the budget, no attempt is made 
to distinguish between the two, both of them being valued 
at the rate of Rp.100. On closer examination, however, a 
case can be made for treating them separately when attempt­
ing to assess the prices at which they can be sold. In 
theory, both the BE-ex Exchange Fund and the BE-K can be 
used to import the same types of goods as the BE-E. But
in practice, they will be restricted in their use to those 
goods which are available in the country from which the 
foreign exchange originates or which supplies the credit 
(we are assuming here that the government will differen­
tiate between the various currencies in the Exchange Fund). 
In the case of Indian BE-K, for example, the market for 
Indian goods in Indonesia is not very attractive, with the
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together, these statements appear to be contradictory. If the 
government felt obliged to enter the market to purchase ex­
change certificates, it could hardly expect to be able to sell 
certificates for the Indian credits, particularly since the 
latter are less attractive than the BE-E because they are tied 
to the import of goods from the country supplying the credit.
We must now consider the effects of the declining BE-rate 
in order to understand why the government decided to enter 
the market as a buyer. Then we must attempt to assess the 
reasons for the decline.
The government decided to increase the amount of BE as 
an incentive to the exporter.62 634 Under the new system, the 
following calculation was made by the government on export 
earnings by the exporter:6 3
50% at a rate of Rp.10 = $1
(Transaction rate + Export Premium) = Rp. 5.-
50% at BE-E rate of Rp.100
(or prevailing rate) = Rp.50.-
Rp. 5 5. -
When the BE in group I was 20%, the exporter received only Rp. 
28. In contrast to this estimated increase in the rupiah earn­
ings per dollar, there were also signs that the costs of the 
exporter were increasing as well. It has been claimed that 
new regulations have not eliminated the price disparity, though 
the government hoped that they would.6 **
exception of gunny bags and hessian cloth. If BE-E and 
BE-K are for sale at the same time, the importer will 
undoubtedly prefer the BE-E. On the other hand, the BE-K 
from Japan will be very much in demand. The certificates 
are not homogeneous and it is unlikely that the importer 
will be prepared to pay the same price for them all. .If 
there are variations in the prices of the certificates the 
government's ability to balance the budget will be affected.
62. Presidium Instruction No. 21/EK/IN/11/1966, appendix, quoted 
in Business News, November 7, 1966, p. 9A.
63. Business News, November 11, 1966. Note that the BE is 
quoted at Rp.100 although it was only Rp.81 on that day.
It is surely more than a mere coincidence that all the 
examples given by government departments use the Rp.100 
rate.
64. Calculation made in Business News, November 2, 1966, (which 
does not seem entirely accurate), and also by the Central
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Domestic inflation has continued since the beginning of 
October and is reflected in the local price of rubber. More­
over, since October, the spread between the official rates of 
exchange (as expressed in the BE rates) and the free market 
rates of exchange has contracted sharply. This means that in 
his attempt to cover the loss on export transactions, the ex­
porter has less room to maneuver in closing the disparity.
Previous changes in the exchange rate system have usually 
been accompanied by a sharp increase in the price of exchange 
certificates. Part of the reason for the reverse trend in late 
1966 has been the increase in the amount of BE-E available.
But even at the low rates for the BE-E there have been rela­
tively few buyers. Some importers may not have the cash to 
buy, while others may be waiting for a further decline, al­
though this is unlikely after the government announced its 
decision to buy BE-E. This action to support the rate may 
succeed, but there is no guarantee that importers will event­
ually purchase the exchange from the government at prices 
close to the rate at which the government bought the BE.
Between January and August, the value of export licenses 
issued each month was within the range of $34.9-41.4 m. (ex­
cluding the $70 m. of May), while in the latter two months it 
was $40.4 and 41.4 m. respectively. In September, only $24.4 m. 
licenses were issued, partly because exporters were holding 
off waiting for new regulations. There was a strong upsurge 
in October, to $67.3 m. but in November and December provision­
al data give licenses of $12.4 m. and $3 m. respectively. If 
these latter estimates are correct the export sector was ex­
periencing real difficulties.
The BE-E rate for December fluctuated around Rp.90 and 
most of the time supply exceeded demand. In the first week 
of the New Year, it was reported that demand exceeded supply 
but this was probably because of the decreasing amount' of ex­
ports in the last two months with a consequent decline in sup­
ply of BE-E. The Exporters1 Association (GPEI) calculated 
that exports in 1967 would be around $450 million, or approx­
imately $120 million per quarter. To earn one dollar, they 
say that Rp.50 of finance is required, or for three months 
(the turn-over period) Rp.6 billion approximately half of which 
is for exports from State Enterprises. About 40% of this 
should be obtained from their own sources and 60% from the 
banks at a "reasonable" rate of interest. Part of this finance 
should be obtained through the banking system and the rest from
Bank. For a brief explanation of the price disparity prob­
lem, see K. D. Thomas, "Price Disparity" in Export Trade, 
Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 4, June 1966,
pp. 101-102.
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the unorganized money market. The bank rate of interest is 
currently 14 percent per month, while in the unorganized money 
market it is about 20%. Assuming a three month turn-over, 
this means that the rate on each transaction is between 42-60%, 
or roughly 50%. Apparently it is now difficult for exporters 
to earn a 50% profit, partly because the difference between 
the free market rate of the rupiah and the official rate re­
ceived by the exporter is only 20 percent. The tight money 
policy is already taking effect in the export sector but the 
situation is more critical in the import sector.
The export and import sectors are closely interrelated in 
several important respects. In our discussion of the effects 
of the October regulations on the import sector we have there­
fore considered it worthwhile to include a considerable amount 
of background on the structure of this sector.
Imports, the BE and Rupiah Financing: Prior to the intro­
duction of the new regulations, the links between the import 
sector and other sectors can be summarized as follows:
Importers:
Users of Imports
1. private, using BE certificates, about 
25% of imports;
2. State Trading Corporations and State 
Enterprises which import on their own 
account using the Foreign Exchange Fund;
3. The government and its various depart­
ments (including the Army) using the 
Foreign Exchange Fund.
1. private manufacturers, especially tex­
tiles ;
2. State enterprises, especially the agri­
cultural estates;
3. Producers of smallholder exports requir­
ing equipment, raw materials;
4. Consumers of essential commodities (in­
cluding those in (3) above), such as rice, 
textiles;
5. Government department.
Both the government and private sectors obtained their 
finance from the State and private banks and from the unorgan­
ized money market.65 The State banks have been a major source
65. The unorganized money market consists of all economic units 
operating outside the banking system. These separate units 
are linked together informally by groups which function as 
financial agents. Usually the "brokers" try to bring to­
gether these units which need credit or cash, and those 
which are ready to supply it on terms acceptable to both
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of funds for the State Enterprises (PN) in general, and the 
State Trading Corporations (PNN) in particular. In 1964 and 
1965, the government tended to channel credits through the 
State enterprises as end-users rather than directly to the 
Trading Corporations as in previous years (see Table II). But 
the manufacturing and agricultural producing units often 
placed indent orders with the State Trading Corporations for 
imports, so that in effect the PNN*s were able to avail them­
selves of government credits. The PNN1s also drew part of 
their finances from the unorganized market.
Table II
Government Credits Advanced to State Enterprises 1960-1965

















1960 8.255 80.77 590 5.78 8.845 10.2201961 11.408 66.45 3.728 21.71 15.136 17.1691962 11.034 40.01 7.131 25.93 18.165 27.508
1963 3.537 9.26 19.330 50.63 22.867 38.19719 64 
1965
6.857 7.15 40.593 42.37 47.450 95.814
January 7.178 7.61 38.723 41.03 45.901 94.369
February 8.600 7.22 61.965 52.00 70.565 119.154
Grand Total includes credits to the Food Purchasing Organiza­
tion (J.U.B.M.) and to the Food Foundation (B.P.U.P.). Be­
cause of the rapid inflation during the period 1960-1965, the 
allocations in percentages are probably more useful for com­
parative purposes than the rupiah totals.
Source: Bank Indonesia.
parties. The commercial sector is therefore able to draw 
upon the resources of these persons, who, over the years, 
have been able to accumulate considerable quantities of 
cash, e.g., lawyers, medical doctors, brokers, high rank­
ing government officials, managers of state enterprises 
and so on. The resources available from this sector are 
probably greater than the resources in the banking system 
(i.e., of private banks and the State banks, excluding 
the Central Bank).
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Private importers financed their imports with assistance 
from manufacturers (on indent orders) and from the unorganized 
money market. Of the manufacturers, the most important are in 
the textile industry where the Chinese, both citizens (WNI) 
and non-citizens, are the most powerful. In the supply of 
goods to the consumer, the distribution units, especially the 
wholesalers, supplied part of the credit to the licensed im­
porters in addition to the amount supplied by the unorganized 
money market. Although the Chinese are not eligible (legally) 
for import licenses, they occupy a strong position in the whole 
sale trade and in the unorganized money market as brokers, and 
as an actual source of the investable funds.
Before the war, the Dutch nBig Ten", companies which be­
side their interests in the import trade also owned banks, 
agricultural estates, manufacturing establishments and so on, 
occupied a key position in the internal distribution trade and 
in the collecting trade which handled the export products of 
the Indonesian smallholder. The "Big Ten" financed a large 
proportion of this trade and were able to draw upon the finan­
cial resources of the banks to assist them, and when they were 
nationalized at the end of 1958, their role was theoretically 
to be taken over by the newly created State Trading Corpora­
tions and the private wholesalers. Both groups helped to 
finance imports, and they also provided credits to the distri­
bution and collecting trades— in the latter trades, the whole­
salers and the unorganized money market were far more impor­
tant than the PNNf s because the State enterprises were not 
permitted to operate as "freely" as private traders.66 The 
supply of local and imported goods to the smallholders, 
through the distribution channels, was a vital link in the 
chain which began with the importer and continued down into 
the village and the farmer as consumer, and then started with 
the farmer as producer of smallholder crops and ended with 
the exporter in the city.
The intricate network of relationships between the var­
ious units in the import and export sectors, between the 
import sector and end-users of imported goods (including the 
manufacturer, the smallholder producing export crops and the 
final consumer), between the import sector and the wholesale- 
retail trade, was and still is held together by the special 
financial arrangements which have evolved over the years.
66. The risks involved in the collecting trade are considerable 
The smallholders often require credit in the form of goods 
and the PNN’s are usually not allowed to offer credit with­
out collateral, for more details see J. Panglaykim, An 
Indonesian Experience: Its State Trading Corporation,
Jajasan Badan Penerbit Universitas Indonesia, Djakarta 1965 
Chapter III, especially pp. 53-54. These conditions have 
not changed since 1961.
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Both the unorganized and the organized money markets are vital 
to the smooth flow of goods. The State Trading Corporations 
were able to get funds from the banking system, dominated as 
it was by government banks, directly or indirectly, whereas 
the private import sector and the wholesale trade has been suc­
cessful in tapping the unorganized money market. Often, the 
State Trading Corporations and the private business community 
co-operated in various informal ways so that each could draw 
on the financial resources of the other. The Chinese business 
group has not been permitted to import on its own account but 
national importers have been heavily dependent on the finan- 
cial resources of Chinese wholesalers and manufacturers and 
these latter have been well-placed to obtain finance from the 
unorganized money market.6 7
The October regulations increased the amount of imports 
which could be handled by the private sector through the sale 
of foreign exchange from exports. The amount of rupiahs re­
quired by private entrepreneurs to finance imports therefore 
increased considerably. A fall in the BE-E rate reduces costs 
but it should not be forgotten that the rate on custom duties 
was raised by 650%. Moreover, the government itself is going 
to sell its own foreign exchange as BE and also the foreign 
exchange from foreign credits. We must now consider whether 
the organized and unorganized money markets can finance such 
trade.
Assuming that exports for 1967 are around $450 million, 
the amount of foreign currency available to the importers will 
be:
1. BE from the Exchange Fund
2. ADO for regions $450 m. x 10%, of which 
we assume the regions will sell 40% to 
importers
3. BE-E of $450 m. x 65%





$ 747.80 m. 67
67. It should not be forgotten that Chinese businessmen in 
both Singapore and Hongkong were an important element 
in Indonesian trade. These outside groups not only ex­
ported goods to Indonesia and purchased Indonesian com­
modities , they were also an important source of credit 
for the Chinese merchants in Indonesia. The elimination 
of Singapore as a trading partner during confrontation 
meant that an important financial link was cut. With the 
ending of confrontation, Singapore as a source of finance 
for internal trade may be restored.
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If we accept the government's figure of Rp.100 for the BE in 
all cases, this amounts to Rp.74.780 million. To this we 
must add customs duties of Rp.9,063 m., to get a total of 
Rp.83.8H3 million. With a turnover of between 2Jg to 3 times 
per annum, the importers would have to find at least Rp.27,948 
million.66
Included as importers are the State Enterprises, especial­
ly the agricultural estates. Presumably, they will use some 
of their BE's for their own enterprise, i.e. , from the BE-E 
of $292.50 million. To that extent private importers will 
have less rupiah to find. But compared to the finance re­
quired previously, the burden on the private sector is con­
siderable, especially if we take into account that the pri­
vate sector must also find rupiah for the export sector as 
well. In the export sector, finance is available in part 
from the banks, but for imports practically no credit is to 
be made available. Prior to the new regulations, the amount 
of rupiah required from the private importers was much less:
1. the amount of BE-E was only 25 percent of total imports;
2. the Exchange Fund rate for its exchange was much lower 
than the rate for the BE, whereas now it is to be close 
to the prevailing BE-E rate;
3. there were few foreign credits, and they were not put 
on the market as BE-K;
4. the customs duty was calculated at the rate of Rp.10
= $1 .
So the total amount of rupiah finance which must be provided 
by the private sector is much greater than before at a time 
when the government is also pursuing a tight money policy.68 9
Precise data are unavailable on the resources in the 
hands of the private sector, especially the unorganized money 
market. But even under the most favorable circumstances, it
68. It would also be interesting to consider the relationship 
between turn-over, money supply, the budget and foreign 
trade. If the government intends to raise a revenue of 
Rp.81 billion, how much business should there be in the 
foreign trade sector to realize this amount? The total 
money supply at present (end December) is Rp.15 billion, 
and the government appears to be acting on the assumption 
that this Rp.15 billion (only a portion of which is avail­
able in the foreign trade sector) can generate Rp.81 biL- 
lion in taxes, an average velocity of 5.3. This does not 
seem to be realistic under present circumstances.
69. This tight money policy seems in principle to be changed 
into more "selective credits" (more directed).
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is doubtful whether it could generate the amount of rupiah re­
quired. The obstacles now hindering the operations of the 
private sector are numerous and make the task even more diffi­
cult. The indigenous importers lack organization, skills and 
finance apart from such enterprises as the Indonesian Service 
Company with its affiliates, Dasaad Concern, N. V. Rahman 
Tamin, P. T. Piola, Bakri Brothers, P. T. Masayu, P. T. Tehnik 
Umum and probably some others in the regions. The Chinese 
group, both WNI and non-citizen, represents as we have seen 
the most important group in the private sector, in manufactur­
ing and in the unorganized money market. It also has an im­
portant role in the distribution and collecting trades. The 
campaign against the Chinese, supposedly those with Chinese 
citizenship (RRT), is affecting all members of the trading 
community and although the government has tried to prevent 
the spread of anti-Chinese feelings, success has eluded it.
The Indonesian economists at their conference in Bandung 
recommended the implementation of Regulation 10/1959 which 
provided for the banning of alien traders in the rural areas. 
MPRS Decision XXIII called for a Law on Domestic Foreign Cap­
ital and the Sultan said that although the Foreign Investment 
Bill was put first because it was the more pressing issue, 
the cabinet was preparing a bill to deal with domestic foreign 
capital. Given that the government has declared that it will 
puruse a pragmatic approach it is expected that it will do all 
it can to prevent further disruption of the trading channels 
at this juncture.
The tax intensification drive is forcing those with cash 
to refrain from channeling it into the various business sec­
tors, including imports.
It would appear from the discussion so far that the role 
of the State Trading Corporations could be expected to expand. 
But they are facing similar problems to the private groups in 
the importing trade. General Suharto told officials of the 
Bank Negara Indonesia that the State Enterprises would no long­
er be given special assistance by the government.70 The govern­
ment agricultural enterprises are fortunate in that they can 
profit from the sale of BE-E, but the State Trading Corporations 
have no such source of finance available to them. Moreover, the 
governments new credit policy allows 9 0% of credits to the pro- 
ductive sector, including food, clothing, transportation, ex­
ports.71 The PNs are again in a more favored position than the 
PNNs because the government expressly prohibits credit alloca­
tions to the import sector. In particular, credits are not
70. Business News, November 4, 1966.
71. Business News, October 28, 1966.
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available for the purchase of BE.
Nor are the State Enterprises exempt from the tax inten­
sification drive. Lists of those which had not filed their 
books appeared in the press in October and those which had not 
paid their taxes were to be given a surat paksa and instructed 
to pay within 48 hours.72 After that time, their goods were 
liable to seizure and auction. Also in October, there were 
already reports of congestion at Tandjung Priok, imported goods 
piling up in the warehouses awaiting clearance. A Presidium 
Instruction of October 25 laid down the procedure for clearing 
the goods from the harbor and those which had been brought in 
for the PNNs and for private importers were to be sold quickly, 
if not they could be auctioned. Apparently the importers were 
not able to obtain finance to pay the customs duties at the 
newly imposed rate.73
In recent years, the State Trading Corporations have been 
obtaining credit indirectly through State Enterprises. If they 
are to survive this practice would have to be continued on a 
much larger scale because of the increased amount of foreign 
exchange available for imports and the increased charges. Sev­
eral of the PNNs are in danger of closing down for lack of 
finance,74 but so far the government has shown no signs of 
lifting the pressures on them.
State Trading Corporations have been the target for a great 
deal of criticism for several years. They have been charged 
with inefficiency and corruption, often not without reason. But 
they have been operating under difficult conditions. Control 
over the import and distribution of nine essential commodities 
is always open to abuse, but the temptations for corrupt prac­
tices during a period of rapid inflation and widespread short­
age of goods are overwhelming. Some managers earned the oppro­
brium in which they were held by the public and were an easy 
target for criticism from political groups.
On the other hand, the corporations are executors of govern­
ment policies and are part of a bureaucratic apparatus which is 
generally regarded as inefficient. Often the PNNs became the 
scapegoat for the mistakes of others. Import policy, for ex­
ample, was the responsibility of other governmental agencies,
72. Business News, October 21, 1966, pp. 5-6 and 11-12. The 
taxes were paid in December.
73. Business News, October 28, 1966. It was also reported that 
some were leaving their goods in the warehouses deliberately
because trade was slack.
74. A n t a r a , December 24, 1966.
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but the Trading Corporations were often blamed for the inade­
quacies of supplies.75 The frequent organizational changes in 
the companies between 1961-1965, were not conducive to effici­
ent operations either and the existence of competing groups 
within the management of the corporations was always a source 
of conflict.
The present government has tended to down-grade the com­
manding role reserved at least in principle for the State Trad­
ing Corporations, and in concrete terms has placed a ban on 
direct credits to the import sector. In part, this is a reflec­
tion of the traditionally hostile attitude towards trade preva­
lent in many circles but it is also due to the past conduct of 
the PNNs themselves. But it is not only the PNNs which are cut 
off from substantial official sources of credit, the entire 
trading sector seems in the same position. The government may 
be acting on the assumption that the private sector, the PNNs 
and the unorganized money market has sufficient resources to 
finance imports at the new high level, in part a reflection of 
the old idea that a large part of the greatly increased money 
supply has found its way into the trading sector. It also seems 
to assume that the PNNs, if permitted to increase their prices, 
will be able to finance themselves without substantial credit 
facilities.
An attempt was made in 1963 to increase government revenues 
from the import sector by increasing the import rate. Foreign 
credits were also expected to flow in and the 196M- budget was 
centered around greatly increased revenues from the import sec­
tor. But stagnation was the result. The State Trading Corpora­
tions could not finance their share of imports with the result 
that goods began to pile up in Tandjung Priok because the com­
panies could not pay the extra duties. Eventually the govern­
ment was obliged to waive the extra charges on condition that 
they be paid later. This sequence of events may well occur 
again.
The PNNs came into existence partly because the private 
national sector was financially too weak to replace the Dutch 
in 1958. Some of the companies are efficient and all of them 
have gained in experience since 1958. They have become an in­
tegral part of the trading structure, having links with both 
the organized and unorganized money markets and operating in 
importing, exporting and the internal distribution and collec­
ting trades. But their ability to tap the resources of the
75. For a detailed analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the PNNs see J. Panglaykim, An Indonesian Experience, Its 
State Trading Corporations. Our description of the role of 
the PNNs leans heavily on this work.
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private sector is greatly reduced by the Instruction that they 
must advise the taxation department, if requested, from whom 
they receive their indent orders. The PNNs were able to resist 
such pressures in the past, based on an understanding reached 
between the respective Ministries. So they were able to con­
tinue to attract money from the public and the unorganized 
money market, giving them a certain degree of control over their 
sources of supply.
Weakening the PNNs does not necessarily open the door to 
the indigenous private trading group because it is still not 
strong financially and organizationally. And the Chinese busi­
ness community is still regarded with suspicion. The govern­
ment is beginning to channel goods through such new government 
owned companies as P.T. Berdikari, but the amount of government 
imports is likely to be far less than previously,given the policy 
of selling exchange from the Foreign Exchange Fund and from 
foreign credits.7® The government may have to revise its atti­
tude towards the PNNs, including its credit restrictions on 
trade. The CatholicParty, in a memorandum to the MPRS, recom­
mended that the PNNs be given special facilities on condition 
that they improve their efficiency and give effective economic 
leadership.7' In trade, state corporations should act to facil­
itate and extend overseas and domestic trade. To this end, the 
party advocated that State Trading Corporations, along with all 
State Enterprises should be guided carefully by the government.
Reports at the beginning of 1967 that both exports and im­
ports were stagnating may induce the government to accept the 
type of proposals presented by the Catholic Party. It should 
be easier for the present leaders to change course because they 
have already emphasized that they will not be doctrinaire in 
their policies. The Indian credits which were available for 
purchase in November were slow to be sold, a clear indication 
of the seriousness of the situation in the import sector where 
finance is in short supply. The rate of the BE-E is now steady 
and there are signs that demand now exceeds supply, but this is 
only because the amount available of BE-E is low as a result of 
the low level of exports in November and December (assuming 
that the provisional data are correct). The partial failure of 
the Paris meeting of creditors was therefore not so harmful at 
this stage. 76*
76. At the present time, P.T. Berdikari works in close coopera­
tion with the government agency Komando Logistik Nasionl 
(Kolognas). In December both of them were coming under 
attack in Parliament. General Suharto denied the charges 
and a correspondent of Angkatan Bersendjata recommended 
"open management" in both institutions to satisfy the 
critics, see A.B., December 17, 1966.
77. "Keadaan Finek Kita Sangat Parah," June 23, 1966.
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The Road to Paris
The government was experiencing some difficulty in imple­
menting its policy measures of October 3, but it did not lose 
sight of the importance of continuing its search for more for­
eign aid. From this standpoint, both the foreign investment 
bill and the decision on foreign companies "taken over" during 
the "physical" phase of confrontation (i.e., after September, 
1963), can be seen as gestures of goodwill and proof of a ra­
tional attitude to the creditor nations, preparing to meet in 
Paris in December. On the other hand, from a long-term point 
of view both are important in their own right, especially the 
foreign investment bill.
The Foreign Investment Bill: MPRS Decision XXIII had re­
quested that a foreign investment law be enacted quickly be­
cause of the scarcity of domestic capital compared with the 
needs of national development. This attitude, as much as any 
other statement on economic matters made by representatives of 
the new order, symbolizes the spirit of the post-coup period.
The desire to attract foreign capital reverses a trend which 
has been a dominant theme in Indonesia's approach to economic 
development since President Sukarno virtually scuttled the For­
eign Investment Law of the Djuanda cabinet in 1958. Although 
Djuanda remained an advocate of foreign investment until his 
death, the old government's attitude was always ambivalent.
The Petroleum and National Gas Mining Law of 1960 led to 
meetings in Tokyo in mid-1963 and to Government Regulation No.
18 of June 1, 1963. The new agreement with the oil companies 
appeared to prepare the way for new explorations,78 but the 
severance of diplomatic relations with the new state of Malaysia 
in September, 1963, shattered those hopes and the relations be­
tween the government and the oil companies steadily worsened. 
Established British, American, Belgian and other foreign com­
panies were "taken over" in 1964, and in 1965, while the oil com­
panies themselves, the last bastions of foreign investment, 
also came under severe pressure.79 On March 20, 1965 all for­
eign oil companies were placed under the control/supervision 
of the government.80 Sukarno's attack on foreign capital in 
his "Berdikari" (self-reliance) speech of April 11, 1965, mere­
ly set the seal on what seemed to be an accomplished fact,
78. See A. Hunter, "The Oil Industry: The 1963 Agreement and
After," Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 2, 
September 1965.
79. Shell oil installations in South Sumatra were almost "taken 
over" in September, 1963, along with other Shell property 
elsewhere in Indonesia. See Hunter, Ibid., p. 31.
80. See Hunter, op.cit.
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putting an end to "the problem of foreign capital in Indone­
sia, so that we can achieve full freedom in the economic 
sphere." In this same speech, the Eight Year Plan was said 
to be no longer appropriate to present conditions because it 
was too dependent on the B-Projects, the foreign exchange ear­
ners which were largely dominated by foreign capital.
Production sharing agreements kept the door ajar for for­
eign investment and were probably in the "non-conventional" 
class of investments as contrasted with the "conventional" 
type which were no longer regarded as suited to the new spirit 
of self-reliance. The general attitude towards foreign cap­
ital, however, was not conducive for the full development of 
production sharing projects either.
The new order adopted a much more favorable attitude 
towards the outside world in general, and towards the West in 
particular. This new approach could only partly be attributed 
to the government’s conviction that a moratorium on foreign 
debts was an absolute necessity for its economic program be­
cause more than fifty percent of its debts are owed to the 
Soviet Union, and also more new credits are needed to enable 
it to tackle the short term problems.81
The government was aware that Indonesia would be competing 
with other countries for investment funds and there are the 
usual favorable conditions for repatriation of capital, a tax 
holiday, and so on.82 Provisions are also made for joint con­
sultation on compensation in the event of nationalization but, 
unlike the investment law of 1958, there is no mention of a 
time-limit on investment.83 The sectors in which foreign in­
vestment will be permitted to operate are not stated with 
clarity in the bill. The government is to decide which fields 
are open to foreign capital and after listing the sectors which 
are closed to the foreigner (article 5), a clause is included 
which allows the government to add to that list. Detailed 
priorities are to be formulated by the government "each time 
(it) draws up its short, medium and long terms plans . . . "  
Moreover, in mining ventures foreign capital participation is 
to be based on co-operation with the Central Mining Authority
81. The Sultan hinted at this in his statement to Parliament
on presenting the Foreign Investment bill, Monitored 18-11-
66.
82. For a complete text of the bill, see Business News, Novem- 
25, 1966.
83. For example, the 1958 law offered titles to agricultural 
estates for a maximum of 30 years (article 7). On the 
other hand, there was no mention of nationalization in 
the old law.
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and will take the form of working contracts and the like.8k
There is no possibility at this stage of predicting exact­
ly in which fields foreign capital will be welcomed. It is for 
this reason that we emphasize that the timing of the bill is 
as important as its actual content. In relation to the rehabil­
itation and stabilization program, it is most unlikely that 
any new investment will be able to contribute anything substan­
tial in the next two years. But the Indonesian delegation to 
Paris was able to take with it a concrete expression of the 
new order1s good and serious intentions.
The Decision on the Return of "Taken Over” Companies: A
number of foreign companies were ntaken over" and placedunder 
the control/supervision of the Indonesian government during the 
period of "physical” confrontation. No definite decision was 
made concerning their status, although it was generally believ­
ed that they would eventually be nationalized.®5 On December 
12, a Presidium Instruction provided for the restoration of the 
companies "taken over" to their former owners, on condition 
that it would not give rise to social tensions in the firms 
concerned and so long as production is guaranteed.84 56
The foreign companies affected include manufacturing es­
tablishments such as Unilever, Naspro87 and Goodyear Tire, 
remilling factories owned by Malaysian residents, and agricul­
tural estates. Until they were "taken over" in 1964 and 1965, 
foreign estates accounted for about one half of the estate area 
in Indonesia and could therefore be regarded as the most im­
portant type of investment apart from the oil companies. Al­
though the data are not available to us, it is likely that the 
leases on most of these estates were nearing the expiration 
date. If we take rubber as an example, any estate which is 
contemplating investment in a replanting program to ensure 
future production levels would require guarantees of tenure for. 
at least 30 years. In part, the foreign investment bill88
84. In the Tokyo Oil Agreement of 1963, the foreign oil companies 
became contractors to the State Oil Enterprises.
85. Almost a year elapsed between the time when the Dutch com­
panies were "taken over" and the enactment of the national­
ization law.
86. Instruksi Presidium Kabinet No. 28/U/IN/12/1966, December 12, 
1966, cited in Business News, December 14, 1966.
87. Naspro was given back to the former owners during the visit 
of the Australian Minister of External Affairs to Djakarta, 
January 25-27, 1967.
88. It became law on December 24, 1966.
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before Parliament fulfilled this function with its offer of 
compensation in the event of nationalization. Nevertheless, 
the reaction of each company may differ considerably, so that 
it is impossible to judge the impact of the government's de­
cision on the foreign investor.
The decision came only three days before the Paris meeting 
began. It is therefore likely that in spite of the uncertain­
ties surrounding its implementation, the government must have 
been hoping that it would create a favorable impression on 
the creditor nations. On December 28, when the meeting was 
over, the cabinet announced' specific conditions pertaining to 
the transfer of the companies to their original owners. Most 
important was the requirement that restoration will only be 
effected where "new investment, expansion or modernization is 
carried out."89 Then in January the government declared that 
the agricultural estates would not be given back. Instead, 
they would be purchased by the government on terms agreeable 
to both sides. In this, the cabinet is probably acting on 
the assumption that if the foreign owners returned they would 
be more concerned with maximizing profits from existing in­
vestments than in investing in an adequate replanting program. 
But it is interesting to observe the timing of the announce­
ment on the conditions of returning the properties. The Paris 
meeting had come and gone, the gesture had been made, and the 
time was ripe for a touch of realism.
Paris and the Decision on the Foreign Debt: The credi­
tor countries meeting m  Tokyo m  September had agreed "in 
principle" to a moratorium and rescheduling of Indonesian debts 
but had decided to consider the matter in detail in Paris in 
December. In general, however, there was an understanding 
that the creditors were only in a position to permit a post­
ponement of payments for two years and that Indonesia should 
commence repayment installments again in 1969.90 Prior to the 
talks in Paris, the Soviet Union had already agreed to a mora­
torium of Indonesia's debts but no details of the terms are 
available to us. But the Paris group followed the Soviet ex­
ample by agreeing to a moratorium on $357 million of the debt 
with a period ranging from 1971 to 1979,91 * a considerable im­
provement on the Tokyo position. On the other hand, it is 
believed that the Indonesian delegation went to the conference 
hoping for a postponement of all repayments, principal as well
89. See The Economist, December 2<+-30, 1966.
90. Business News, December 12, 1966.
91. Our information on the Paris meeting is taken from The
Economist, December 2H--30, 1966.
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as interest, until 1973.92
The results achieved at Paris therefore fell short of In­
donesian expectations. No action was taken on $600 million 
of the debt^3 and repayment on that part of the debt on which 
a moratorium has been declared must begin in 1971. At the 
same time, an interest rate of 7 percent is to be charged on 
the overdue payment. Another conference has been scheduled 
for February in Holland to discuss unsettled issues.
Indonesia1s position is summed up in the statement made 
by Foreign Minister Adam Malik when he commented that if debt 
repayment must begin in 1969, the government is only able to 
set aside 15 percent of export earnings annually for this pur­
pose.94 Even at a rate of $100 million a year, it would take 
23 years to repay all debts incurred before the "perfected” 
Dwikora cabinet took office in March 1966, and new debts have 
been incurred since then including the $165 million (FI.600 
million) to Holland as compensation. But if we use the For­
eign Minister1s calculation, annual payments of $100 million 
a year would be equivalent to total export earnings of $660 
million. In 1964, the latest figure we have, exports without 
oil totalled $456.8 million. If we include oil we could expect 
a figure of approximately $520 million.
An austerity program formulated in 1963 by a group of 
foreign advisors to the Indonesian government included import 
requirements of around $610 million a year.95 This program 
made no provision for new investment projects. But if the 
governments rehabilitation and stabilization program is suc­
cessful, it is probable that the government will want to begin 
new projects in a development plan. Import requirements would 
then be in excess of $610 million.
Indonesia1s export earning capacity is unlikely to increase 
sufficiently to support either the austerity program (exclusive 
of debt repayment) or a more ambitious development program in
92. Business News, December 12, 1966.
93. We are using the total debt figure cited by J. Panglaykim 
and H. W. Arndt "Survey of Recent Developments,” Bulletin 
of Indonesian Economic Studies, No. 4, June 1966, Table 1, 
p-! 5 rather than the figure of $750 million mentioned in 
The Economist, December 24-30, 1966.
94. Business News, December 12, 1966.
95. For a discussion of this program, see K. D. Thomas and J. 
Panglaykim, op.cit. This paragraph is based upon this 
article, including Part II, which is to be published in 
Bulletin No. 6 and as a booklet, Rotterdam University Press, 
April 1967.
119
the years up to 1970 at least.96 The government is partially 
aware of its dilemma, although sometimes its officials tend 
to overestimate the countryfs export capacity over the next 
few years. We have already mentioned that even if the foreign 
investment law attracts new capital, especially in the export 
sector, it is unlikely to be very productive in the next four 
to five years. A moratorium on all debts is therefore essen­
tial and the terms of the Paris meeting fall short of what is 
required even for the Western portion of the debt. Moreover, 
if we assume that Indonesian export earnings are unlikely to 
exceed 600 million in the near future, more credits will be 
necessary for the success of any rehabilitation and stabiliza­
tion program without even considering a development program.
Conclusion
In this article, we have attempted to show that many of 
the principles which have been espoused in the post coup period 
are not new. Foreign investment is to be welcomed, private en­
terprise is to be permitted to operate in all fields which "do 
not affect the livelihood of the people," and regional govern­
ments are to be given greater opportunities to assist in the 
development of their respective areas. But in each case there 
are certain qualifications, and until the government begins to 
legislate in these matters we cannot be sure how the principles 
will be implemented.
The series of regulations issued on October 3, 1966 were 
the first concrete steps taken by the government in the eco­
nomic sphere, apart from the institution of a tax drive and 
statements on a tight money policy. By the end of the year 
there was a general malaise in the foreign trade sector as a 
result of the changes brought about by the regulations. There 
are indications that the government expects too much from the 
private sector, overestimating its financial resources, while 
the tendency to down-grade the role of the State Trading Corpor­
ations may be premature and ill-conceived. Added to this are 
the problems arising from the campaign against the alien Chinese 
who are strong in the trading channels. Fortunately, the gov­
ernment has declared that it is not going to be doctrinaire in 
its attitude so that modifications in its policies can be ex­
pected if it is clear that the economy is not functioning pro­
perly.
Every effort is being made to persuade creditor countries
96. The assumptions on which this statement rest are the theme 
of the article/booklet cited in footnote 2 above.
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to offer a moratorium and re-scheduling of debts. In spite of 
the low earning capacity of the export sector in relation to 
the requirements of a rehabilitation and stabilization program, 
the creditor nations have adopted a very cautious approach. A 
careful assessment of Indonesia’s position indicates that more 
credits are necessary if the Ampera cabinet is to succeed in 
its ;economic policies.
The Government has only been in office for six months but 
time is pressing if it wishes to create the stable conditions 
it thinks are necessary for holding elections. Much needs to 
be done to restore the country’s economy and to provide the 
basis from which a development program can be launched. Politi­
cal instability is still affecting the economic situation and 
is not conducive to efforts to improve the economic situation 
but a serious attempt is being made. The transition period 
will be difficult and we should not expect too much in the 
initial stages.
Canberra January 1967
